


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ABSTRACT

VERTICAL AND HORIZONTAL COHESION: COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS AND THE PROBLEM OF MANPOWER TURBULENCE by LtCol Christian B. Cowdrey, USMC

This monograph seeks to answer the questions: Do current manpower-management processes support Marine Corps doctrine by recognizing the importance of unit cohesion both vertically and horizontally? In this post-cold war period are manpower managers guilty of mismanagement of dwindling personnel resources as the Corps attempts to respond to new strategies and increasing commitments?

To answer this question the monograph first establishes the importance of the human dimension of combat. Central to this discussion is the examination of theory and the physical, cybernetic, and moral domains of battle. These last two domains are concerned with the destruction of command and control and the destruction of will that are key concerns within Marine Corps' warfighting doctrine. The monograph illustrates the important relationship between cohesion and combat effectiveness. Recent attempts to promote cohesion within the Army and Marine Corps are looked at to help further define the problems with horizontal and vertical cohesion. Next is an examination of current Marine Corps manpower management policies to decide whether they support both theory and doctrine. Marine Corps doctrine is analyzed to highlight the exiting inconsistencies between doctrine and policy.

The monograph concludes with recommendations on ways manpower managers can better support doctrine and improve cohesion. Improving cohesion really means improving vertical cohesion in an effort to reduce problems with staff turbulence at the MEF level of command. A staff that is allowed to gain experience both in their jobs and in their relationship with the commander is going to be able to practice the decentralized command and control system sought in Marine Corps Maneuver Warfare Doctrine. Manpower needs to support doctrine and not individual career paths. Careerist and "me-first" mentalities are mindsets that work against both horizontal and vertical cohesion. Careerist are non-heroic leaders driven towards personal glory. What is needed within the Corps is heroic leadership that is capable of refocusing the personnel management system on the human dimension in an effort to reduce turbulence and increase cohesion within the MEF.

VERTICAL AND HORIZONTAL COHESION: COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS AND THE PROBLEM OF MANPOWER TURBULENCE

A Monograph

by

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United States Marine Corps



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Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

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(The U.S. Military) "personnel system is a reflection of cultural values--particularly American individualism, sense of fair play, equity, and the importance of career advancement. Although US forces performed well in previous wars, experience during the Vietnam conflict suggests that our personnel policies did not foster cohesion in that era. In a future war, we may not be able to count on superior technology, firepower, industrial might, and sheer numbers to compensate for a lack of cohesion."¹

I. INTRODUCTION

GENERAL SITUATION

As we approach the 21st century, the United States is again in a transition period. The security environment that challenges our Nation today and into the next century is driven by the evolving nature of new emerging states and alliances. The National Military Strategy of the United States allows for this new strategic landscape. The recently completed Bottom-Up Review (BUR) outlines the military force structure necessary to carry out this National Military Strategy. A new "Base Force" is the means for carrying out this strategy. While this force will be smaller, we expect it to be more flexible, well trained, and highly capable to handle further changes in the strategic environment. "The object is to maintain -- and where possible enhance -- the combat readiness of the Armed Forces even as we reduced their size and the cost of maintaining them."² A reduction in force, however, does not imply any corresponding reduction in optempo.

More critical than ever, in today's world of doing more with less, is the need for the Armed Forces of the United States and particularly the Marine Corps to retain its warrior spirit. Optempo is a popular term used to describe the pace of

operations and training. According to the JCS's Roles, Missions, and Functions manual: "Optempo decides the rate at which funds are spent from the Operations and Maintenance (O&M) accounts to buy the fuel, repair parts, and supplies consumed during normal operations."³ The recent increased emphasis on resource intensive operations, like peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance, means a significant increase in spending. Why is it that we only see the problem in terms of O&M accounts used to purchase fuel, repair parts, and supplies? Where is the concern for the human dimensions of war? When we combine existing manpower turbulence, made worse by reductions in force structure, with increases in operations something is bound to give. Will it be the human element of war routinely ignored in periods of transition? Are the Marines at all affected by the combined effects of optempo and force reductions? What is happening to the Marine Corps' already lean fighting force and its warfighting philosophy?

THE MARINE CORPS

The Marine Corps, over the past few years, reduced its active end strength some 20,000 from the level employed in Desert Storm. Does this reduction in size adequately support National Military Strategy and the Corps' forward presence and response missions? Those within the Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC) are inclined to say yes. Though stretched thin, on the surface it appears that our Corps has sufficient numbers to man existing units within the Fleet Marine Force (FMF). Their view is that the Marine Corps stands ready to do the job demanded by the new strategy. The Corps advertises, despite resource

reductions, an ability to retain all previous missions while maintaining a high tempo of operations. These reductions in manpower and the corresponding reductions in material and advanced technologies are, however, in direct contradiction with Marine Corps doctrine. FMFM -1 Warfighting, the Marine Corps cornerstone doctrinal publication, states that "attempts to reduce warfare to ratios of forces, weapons, and equipment neglect the impact of the human will on the conduct of war and is therefore inherently false."⁴ Concern for the human dimension and its effect on unit cohesion is hard to find.

Dr. James J. Schneider, Theory Instructor at the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS), speaks to the importance of the role of the human will at all echelons as the "iron core of combat power."⁵ Because war is a clash between opposing human wills, the human dimension is central in war. Morale is a qualitative measure of the willingness to act. War is an extreme trial of moral and physical strength and stamina. In peace time there is a tendency to ignore the moral characteristics of war as less tangible than the physical characteristics as we prepare for future wars. Dr. Roger Spiller, Professor of Combined Arms Warfare, writes that "the human dimension is the first consideration to slip from view after the declaration of peace. Understanding the effects of battle on soldiers, units, and leaders (in peace time), is roughly the same, as leap(ing) tall buildings with a single bound."⁶

THE CORPS QUESTION

The question the monograph seeks to answer the following, "Do current

manpower-management processes support Marine Corps doctrine by recognizing the importance of unit cohesion both vertically and horizontally? Horizontal cohesion and vertical cohesion, according to Lawrence Boice and Hope Tarr of the US Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, are "two quantitative measures of unit integrity and stability. Horizontal cohesion is the caring among soldiers and provision of mutual support. Vertical cohesion is best described as leader-led support."⁷ In this post-cold war period are manpower managers guilty of mismanagement of dwindling personnel resources as the Corps attempts to respond to new strategies and increasing commitments? While Marine Corps Doctrine speaks to the importance of leaders developing unit cohesion and esprit as combat force multipliers, manpower policies do not. Manpower managers fail to address the importance of these human dimensions in their personnel assignment policies. Though developed with the best of intentions, manpower-management processes often end up more important than the very soul of the Corps they are designed to serve.

METHODOLOGY

To answer this question the monograph will first establish the importance of the human dimension of combat. Central to this discussion will be the examination of theory and the physical, cybernetic, and moral domains of battle. What causes units to transition from the physical destruction of the enemy (physical domain) to one of disorganization (cybernetic domain) and finally to reach a state of disintegration (moral domain)? These last two domains are

concerned with the destruction of command and control and the destruction of will that are key concerns within Marine Corps' warfighting doctrine. The monograph will then illustrate the important relationship between cohesion and combat effectiveness. Recent attempts to promote cohesion within the Army and Marine Corps are looked at to help further define the problems with horizontal and vertical cohesion. Next will be an examination of the current Marine Corps manpower management policies to decide whether they support both theory and doctrine. Marine Corps doctrine will be analyzed to highlight the existing inconsistencies between doctrine and policy. Recommendations will be made on ways manpower can better support doctrine and improve cohesion. Finally a summary will conclude with a review of the merits of cohesion as an important manpower management idea and a recommendation on how the Marine Corps can improve the linkage between doctrine and personnel policy.

"In isolation and desolation, the soldier faces the yawning abyss of the empty battlefield; threatening to engulf him in the black jaws of moral destruction."⁸

II. THEORY

The SAMS theory course examines the primary conditions of the battlefield and the theater of operations that led to the emergence of operational art from the classical style of war. Many of the causal factors that led to this revolution in military art were a direct result of innovations in military technology that developed during the Industrial Revolution. Five technological innovations are referred to as most responsible for not only increasing battlefield lethality but also for reducing battlefield casualties. They are:

- The development of the rifled musket and minie ball
- A breech-loading mechanism
- Introduction of magazines
- Smokeless powder
- Barbed wire

The development of the rifled musket and minie bullet dramatically increased battlefield lethality. Concurrently the development of the breechloader, the magazine and smokeless powder increased battlefield dispersion. As lethality increased so did dispersion. Less dense formations meant less mutual support between soldiers no longer in close proximity of one another. Without this support soldiers tended to flee from the horrors of battle. "As units took

advantage of the survivability derived from dispersion, the moral cohesion, brought about through the social association of troops in close physical proximity to one another, was attenuated."⁹ It is not dispersion due to a policy of force protection that is behind the paradox, but rather "armies incur fewer casualties in the face of more lethal weapons, because they are unable to sustain themselves psychologically and with sufficient strength of will to continue and press the fight to its ultimate conclusion."¹⁰ Armies, therefore, tend to become disorganized and disintegrate under pressures of more lethal modern weapons.

Dr. Schneider describes three phases that armies go through in battle as the physical, cybernetic, and moral domains. Figure A is a graphic representation of how these domains act on soldiers in combat. Based on a physics analogy, this figure compares the processes of destruction (the physical domain), disorganization (the cybernetic domain), and disintegration (the moral domain) with the three states of matter an object, in this case an army, may display when energy, in the form of combat power, is applied.

Casualties, in figure A, are a function of destructive tempo. Casualties are analogous to temperature and destructive tempo or combat power is analogous to heat. Casualties become a measure of the heat (military energy) applied to an opposing force.

As more combat energy is transferred to the opposing force at the micro level the macro phase of the army may change to one of disorganization that is analogous to the liquid state of matter. The concern here is with the cybernetic




Figure : Destruction, Disorganization, Disintegration

domain. Finally the army may reach a state of disintegration, a state analogous to gas, as the destruction of will occurs in the moral domain. These last two domains are concerned with destruction but of a different sort: the destruction of command and control and the destruction of will.¹¹ The slope of the curve in figure A measures, to a degree, inner coherence of the unit and its will. The more the unit can remain cohesive with a will to continue the fight the more the unit may withstand the heat of battle.

The origins of contemporary command and control are found in the Industrial Revolution and the changes it provided in terms of span of control: size of military forces, operational and tactical battlespace, and communications systems. The telegraph and railroad provided quantum leaps in technology that, when coupled with the societal and cultural advances of the time, mark the beginning of operational art.

Today there is a tendency to rely heavily on technology, training, and organization to overcome the effects of disorder that result from the physical process of destruction. While Marine Corps command and control theory emphasizes the need for superior leadership in order to temper these effects, personnel policies have done little to help withstand the heat of battle.

Moral disintegration or demoralization is the last phase an army goes through before its complete and total collapse. It is simply the loss of the will to fight. "Will", according to Schneider, "is concerned with the desire to act. Morale is a qualitative measure of the willingness to act in the face of adversity.

Low morale would imply a low willingness to act in combat."¹² While stress and fear are major factors degrading morale; unit esprit, motivation, and leadership can increase morale.

Clausewitz places great emphasis on the leader who must be composed of the gift of the mind and the gift of temperament. The leader must help maintain the soldier's will to fight. The way a leader reduces the fog and friction of war is through combat experience and peacetime training that includes elements of friction.¹³

Like Clausewitz, S.L.A. Marshall said that "the real source of a nation's military power is not wealth, material resources, and industrial genius but instead its strength lies in the hearts and spirits of men."¹⁴ Marshall recognized that certain elements helped develop a military unit's strength. Unity of effort, morale, and leadership are key to his writings on the spirit of fighting men.

In his book, Combat Motivation, Anthony Kellett discusses the factors that combine to influence human behavior on the battlefield. The goal is to avoid disintegration. Kellett discusses several factors affecting combat performance.

They are:

- Membership and cohesiveness of the primary group
- Unit esprit
- Manpower allocation, i.e., assignment policies
- Socialization
- Discipline
- Training
- Leadership
- Ideology
- Rewards

- Preconceptions of combat

While all are important in varying degrees, central to this present study are those factors that deal with cohesion. At least in theory the importance of these factors toward improved combat effectiveness is recognized. The question remains who within the Marine Corps understands the absolute necessity of maintaining cohesion within the Corps?

Christopher Straub, author of The Unit First, would suggest it is the manpower managers. "Because confidence, teamwork, and will are human attributes, in the military division of labor it is the personnel system that should supply or produce or nurture these qualities, just as the logisticians should supply ammunition and the tacticians create the doctrine. The personnel system recruits people, groups them into units, promotes and develops them, and moves them to fill Service needs. The way they do these things can foster or inhibit the qualities that soldiers and units must have if units are to fight well, if units are to be cohesive under stress."¹⁵

Cohesion together with esprit de corps and unity of purpose are critical factors that tend to hold units together in combat situations that might cause others under similar stressful conditions to disintegrate. "Cohesion denotes the feelings of belonging and solidarity that occur mostly at the primary group level and result from sustained interactions, both formal and informal, among group members on the basis of common experiences, interdependence, and shared goals and values. Esprit denotes feelings of pride, unity of purpose, and adherence to

an ideal represented by the unit"¹⁶ It is time to give unit cohesion another look and remind ourselves that it is not good enough simply to equip Marines only to swiftly deploy them to battle. Units that are expected to fight well must first possess a will to fight as a cohesive team, confident in each other and in their team's performance. Current theoretical linkage between fighting well and cohesive units is addressed through programs that foster horizontal cohesion alone.

Cohesion has been defined as: The bonding together of members of an organization/unit in such a way as to sustain their will and commitment to each other, their unit, and the mission.¹⁷

III. HORIZONTAL COHESION

Horizontal cohesion is a quantitative measure of a unit's integrity and stability. As addressed earlier, it is the caring among soldiers together with the provisions of mutual support. S.L.A. Marshall speaks directly to the issue of horizontal cohesion by saying: "It is from the acquiring of the habit of working with the group and of feeling responsible to the group that [a soldier's] thoughts are apt to turn ultimately to the welfare of the group when tactical disintegration occurs in battle; the more deeply this is impressed into his consciousness, the quicker will he revert under pressure to thinking and acting on behalf of the group."¹⁸

"The United States Armed Forces recognized in the early 40's that the personnel system was deficient in providing cohesion and a will to fight, but under the pressure of worldwide operations few changes were made."¹⁹ Unit rotation policies soon gave way to individual rotation policies. Rotations were hinged on merit, combat time, WIAs, and combat awards. What this did was pull from combat units their bravest and most experienced soldiers leaving the leadership responsibilities to a group of inexperienced soldiers. "In doing so the Armed Forces were unwittingly saying that equity to individuals, the perception of soldiers and their families at home that the services were fair, was more

important than the performance of its units in battle."²⁰

The Vietnam war is our most recent example of "military leadership [again] choosing political effectiveness [equality to individuals] over operational effectiveness in designing a personnel system."²¹ Consequently, all levels of the U.S. Military exhibited a low degree of unit cohesion. According to Christopher C. Straub, author of The Unit First, "This type of personnel system is a natural offshoot of our industrial experience as a nation."²²

Once considered the modern way to organize, the enormously complex functioning of a division in battle was more understandable as a factory, an assembly line at which 16,000 workers did their many distinct tasks, which in sum equaled the division mission. So manpower specialists analyzed military jobs, and described the tasks in each job in precise detail, the training centers taught the tasks to soldiers, and soldiers were assigned to positions in units that had been coded for that specific job. Jobs in the same field but at greater levels of responsibility were differentiated by "pay grade" or "skill level," a more scientific way of saying "rank." While this type of system was consistent with the individual rotation policies it weakened unit cohesion in the process.²³

In the late 70's the U.S. Army embarked upon several studies to examine the impact of technology on the modern battlefield to include the impact on psychological factors affecting a soldier's will to fight. In April 1981 the Army initiated Project COHORT (Cohesion Operational Readiness and Training) based on the conclusions of these studies. The test of COHORT units first started with

companies and continued through 1986 with the rotation of four COHORT Battalions within the 7th Infantry Division. Two major experimental interventions were planned. The first was to be company chain-of-command leadership training and the second, a set of division-level policies calculated to enhance small-unit member and leader-led stability. The two surveys used were the Platoon Cohesion Index and the Soldier Survey. The findings show that personnel management within units is based on policy and leadership philosophies that generally work against the development of cohesive units and thus limit probable combat readiness. Project COHORT officially ended with a decision by the Army Chief of Staff General Carl E. Vuono that it was just too difficult to manage and not worth the start-up costs.

Soon after the U.S. Marine Corps implemented their own program designed to improve unit readiness, cohesion, and stability known as The TOUR II Long Range Staffing Process. TOUR II marries the life cycle of a first term enlisted Marine with the deployment cycle of a battalion, battery, or squadron. This marriage allows Marines to end their active service (EAS) or reenlist within their first unit. While this is an improvement it should not be confused with unit-replacement "born, live, and die" units found in both the British and German Armed Forces.

In an attempt to further reduce personnel turbulence a second program is now in effect within the Marine Corps. Major Western Pacific Commands are now manned with entire units from stateside Divisions, Wings, and Force Service

Support Groups. This program, known as the Unit Deployment Program (UDP) is designed to decrease personnel turbulence, and increase unit stability and cohesion. Again an improvement over the individual replacement system used in the past but only a benefit for the six month deployment period.

While TOUR II and UDP programs are still in use and considered successful by manpower planners, like the Army's COHORT program, they only address horizontal cohesion. Vertical cohesion in both services remains largely unchanged. Neither the Army nor Marine programs effectively control personnel turbulence at the leadership level. Personnel turbulence that unnecessarily affects leadership is of concern because it erodes cohesion -- resulting in a more centralized system of command and control, and lower morale.

These recent efforts directed at improving horizontal cohesion within the Army and the Marine Corps, up to the battalion and squadron level, might be the best we can expect during this post war period. However, the need to improve vertical cohesion has actually increased as we look for ways to offset cuts in manpower and increases in optempo. The continued movement of key personnel both within and between units during this transition period hurt stability at a time when it is needed most.

Marine Corps doctrine demands a cohesive, stable, and decentralized style of control to operate effectively under its maneuver warfare philosophy. Still those within the personnel assignment system insist on operating a system centered around a sense of fair play, equity, and the importance of career

advancement. Today's increasing optempo and uncertain future demands a change towards a personnel program that promotes vertical cohesion within the Marine Corps' warfighting headquarters.

The policy of the Marine Corps is to limit the number of PCS moves to those required to achieve/maintain combat readiness or to ensure equitable treatment and career development of individual Marines. Compliance with this policy improves combat readiness by controlling personnel turnover, reducing travel costs, and increasing the stability of Marine families.²⁴

IV. MANPOWER AND VERTICAL COHESION

Vertical cohesion is best described as leader-lead support.

Vertical cohesion is the product of personnel stability and sound leadership.

Commanders need to be concerned with enhancing vertical cohesion as one means of achieving higher levels of combat efficiency. Insufficient Leader-lead stability is of concern because it tends to erode subordinate unit cohesion, resulting in a reduction in overall performance and morale. Commanders that are asked to fight in an environment of uncertainty, must have a cohesive staff capable of developing flexible plans and fostering initiative among subordinate commanders.

It is generally accepted that a personnel system recruits people, groups them into units, promotes and develops them, and moves them to fill service needs. The way they do these things can foster or inhibit the qualities that Marines and Marine units must have if they are to fight well - - if units are to be cohesive in combat. Has manpower failed to adopt the virtues of vertical cohesion as preached in our own warfighting doctrine?

In recent years Service chiefs and secretaries have praised the quality of

our forces as the best peacetime force since World War II. Marines are far smarter than those inducted during the Vietnam War. Reenlistments are high. Disciplinary problems are at the lowest level since records were kept. We have more highly trained Marines than ever manning new equipment that obviously increases our overall capabilities as a combat force. One may be inclined to believe that the Marine Corps manpower system is largely responsible for our recent success. While they are recognized for doing a great job recruiting the right people and giving them challenging, satisfying duty they cannot be credited with providing Fleet Marine Force commanders with more cohesive and synchronized staffs. Perhaps as Cohen and Gooch, authors of Military Misfortunes suggest we need to look at the military world in a new way. "Instead of testing men and institutions, we must examine the structures through which they work and explore how those structures stand up to the stresses they encounter."²⁵ Is our manpower personnel system designed to have a positive affect on vertical cohesion in theory's cybernetic domain? Is it handling the stresses of this post cold war period in a way that improves combat effectiveness?

Cybernetics focuses on the ability of commanders to control resources of an organization by means of communication systems. Command and control functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission. "It is a process that unifies the efforts of

thousands of men performing a bewildering array of battlefield functions, each one of which is utterly essential to success."²⁶

In modern military conflict the role of command is to make a faster, clearer reading of a situation, and a more effective distribution of resources based on the situation. Communication systems merely constitute a part of what command is all about. Martin van Creveld reminds us that "the factor which decided the issue [victory] was not technology, but the ability to combine hardware, training, doctrine, and organization into a single decisive whole," and that "war is too complex a tapestry to be dominated by a single thread, however thick and however brilliant."²⁷

Commanders, according to Cohen and Gooch, are often "bound by organizational restraints, and only by understanding these restraints can a commander take action to make them less confining. Modern war is too complex to pin failures on a single individual who is forced to exercise centralized control for lack of a cohesive staff. The importance of the general's staff as a means of fostering genius in their commander must not be overlooked. Like Moltke's command system "the Prussian General Staff was superior to that of any of its predecessors, yet still unburdened by excessive rigidity and specialization. It placed heavy reliance on careful planning and preparation but was not misled into believing that this planning and this preparation could be extended beyond the reach of the railheads and into the battlefield."²⁸ Manpower's inability to identify personnel turbulence as a restraint of the MEF commander has restricted his

abilities to accomplish critical tasks according to Marine Corps Warfighting doctrine. The evolution of the cybernetic domain of battle from the Industrial Revolution to the present day has progressively complicated the process of command and control on the battlefield.

"The days of the all-seeing commander sitting on his horse surveying the battlefield are gone. Not only has the battlefield exploded in scale, it has expanded in scope. The military dimensions of space, time, and energy must now embrace the social, economic and political dimensions of OOTW (Operations Other Than War)"²⁹. A staff's attempt to blend this data into a logical whole that the commander can understand is made more difficult when personnel stability is lacking. It is unrealistic to expect our MEF commanders to develop the "human element of command" when staff turbulence exists. As experience has shown, without stability we are all too often forced to adopt a centralized system of command and control when our own Maneuver Warfare doctrine calls for a decentralized system. Equally important is the need for future staff officers that understand operational art and campaign planning.

If a plan is to add structure and cohesion to future MEF operations it is important that you first have cohesion within the staff that must develop and execute such a plan. "A plan is a blueprint for the future . The structure of the blueprint is brought together by the will of the commander, and it is held together by the strength of a cohesive staff."³⁰ Personnel turbulence within the MEF may in fact be restraining us from even greater accomplishments in the more

important area of combat readiness.

Attempts to sustain vertical cohesion within the combat arms units of the Marine Corps are hampered by the premium Marine culture has placed on equity in individual career development. The personnel assignment system of the Marine Corps favors the independence of individual career officers over their interdependence within a unit. The continued practice of moving officers from key billet to key billet represents a cultural bias rather than an essential ingredient of a successful Corps. In the Army this practice is part of the branch qualification process. Within the Marine Corps this branch function is provided by the assignment officers and career counselors in the Personnel Management Division. Your competitiveness for promotion is often the reason for a move into or out of the Fleet Marine Force.

Today's reducing personnel strength only means more turbulence at a time when vertical cohesion within the MEF headquarters is more important than ever. Col Wood, USMC, former Chief of Staff for FMF PAC, claims that current scheduled commitments within the Marine Corps have roughly one third of the Corps under PCS (Permanent Change of Station) Orders everyday of the year. According to Col Wood, "the result is that the Corps has no long standing and cohesive MEF Headquarters at a time when they are needed most."³¹ The Marine Corps is not alone. All services must now realize and plan for the possibility of having Corps/Fleet staffs that are capable of transforming into joint task force headquarters over night.

THE PROBLEM OF VERTICAL COHESION

The effects of personnel turbulence on vertical cohesion and combat performance are many. A recent conversation with an OC (Observer/Controller) at the Army's NTC (National Training Center) helps to illustrate this point. When asked what he found most disturbing about his three years evaluating Corps and Brigade size headquarters rotating through the NTC he said: "It was seeing the same headquarters making the same mistakes rotation after rotation."³² The most obvious cause of repeated mistakes is the constant rotation of officers and SNCOs into key positions within each staff being evaluated. A direct correlation can be made between performance and the stability of a staff. While personnel stability alone may not be sufficient, it is absolutely essential to both cohesion and a quality performance. Where the turnover involves leaders, units are often forced to expend enormous amounts of adaptive energy getting used to the command style and emphasis of each in a constant stream of new commanders.³³ The Army's solution to personnel turbulence within their staffs is to develop more controls and processes that lead inexperienced staff members through the decision-making process. The Marine Corps, on the other hand, prefers to ignore the problem all together. Turbulence is just another part of the uncertainty the Corps seems willing to accept as a part of modern and future war.

Current political initiatives designed to foster greater jointness through rapid theater integration of existing service staffs only exacerbate the problem. U.S. military units, according to Steven L. Canby, professor of Operational Art at

Georgetown University, are "continuous life" units where personnel come and go individually. Readiness and training proficiency are accordingly bounded, never reaching the extended high and the short down periods of unit-replacement "born, live, and die" units.³⁴ All MEF level staffs are "continuous life units." In continuous life units, the payoff from joint staff training is short-lived as personnel leave, and can only be retained by assigning the same tasks to the same unit repeatedly. Like the NTC repetitive training means starting from scratch each time a unit experiences personnel turbulence. Maintaining readiness in the Fleet Marine Force under the current personnel system is like being on a treadmill. Jointness really means there is even more of a reason the issue of personnel stability must be addressed within the MEF headquarters.

Coalition warfare and the employment of Joint Task Forces (JTFs) are warfare concepts of the future. The likelihood of a Unified CINC deploying again is small. Reality says we will continue to form JTFs to handle geographically separated and distinct missions within the CINC's Area of Responsibility (AOR). These JTFs represent change brought on by the Goldwater Nichols Act that now has separate services performing the additional function of a force provider. All services must respond to a Joint Mission Essential Task List or JMETL. The proper personnel mix of a competent joint fighting force and the metering out of remaining force packages within a CINC's theater is fast becoming an art form. Forward Presence that replaces Forward Basing creates the need for a deployable JTF capable headquarters. This rapid transformation of

a MEF headquarters can have a profound impact on the functioning of the staff made worse if cohesion and personnel stability are missing. These headquarters will provide the linkage between a CINC's regional strategic aims and the tactical level of war.

Successfully generating this force is dependent upon all services working joint procedures, policies, and plans together. Can a "continuous life unit" like a Marine Expeditionary Force Headquarters provide such a cohesive link without first solving their personnel instability problems?

The Unified Commands have identified the several solutions to potential problems subordinate commanders might have deploying as JTFs. CINCPAC is providing a rapid augmentation cell called the Deployment (JTF) Augmentation Cell or DJTFAC from the CINC's existing staff for immediate deployments once a JTF is formed. Additionally CINCPAC is attempting to give each designated JTF headquarters, which includes III MEF, two staff visits and one joint exercise a year. Given the current levels of personnel turbulence both events amount to nothing more than repetitive training referred to by Canby.

The future challenge for the Marine Corps will be to provide a commander and a staff that can support both service and CINC functions in today's joint environment. Once a subordinate commander is designated a JTF Headquarters the commander and his staff, according to Gen Franks, USA (ret), must focus their efforts on "Rapid Team Building." In the joint environment, getting to know augments and learning how each other thinks has become an

important element of combat power. While CINCs assume it will work, in reality "Rapid Team Building" requires a tremendous amount of effort. The designated JTF Commander, according to Gen Franks USA(ret), must make use of "frequent meetings that focus on warfighting, wargaming, and exercises to develop the right framework for working through the many problems associated with deploying as a Joint Task Force."³⁵ Rapid Team Building becomes impossible if the existing Team lacks cohesion.

Turbulence, according to Straub, is a stability problem atmosphere in units where soldiers stay for short durations. The shorter the duration, the more turbulent is the environment of the unit.³⁶ The likelihood that cohesive teams will form decreases in a turbulent unit. While both TOUR II and the UDP programs reduce turbulence within specific units, they only address horizontal cohesion at levels below battalions and squadrons. Personnel turbulence remains a significant problem when you are addressing vertical cohesion or stability within the higher headquarters of the Fleet Marine Force. Are the Marine Corps manpower planners providing the necessary human element of command and control to the Fleet Marine Force that its doctrine says it must have to win? Or is turnover of officers within the Fleet Marine Force killing our leader-lead cohesion at a time when it is most needed.

Marine Corps Doctrine demands that we have, within the FMF, cohesive command structures capable of expanding in time of war. If this is so then vertical cohesion not horizontal cohesion must become a manpower priority if we

are to face successfully the challenges of the 21st Century. Today, with the increases in optempo, the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) Headquarters is an important command structure for the accomplishment of National Military Strategy. Vertical cohesion within these headquarters provides needed stability necessary to expand in time of war. In time of crisis there will be insufficient time to round out these staffs and conduct the necessary "teambuilding" meetings and exercises considered by some as essential in addressing the problems of modern and future wars. Experience has already shown that during a crisis all available time is spent preparing for the actual deployment. Turnover rates within these headquarters must be kept to an absolute minimum if MEF commanders and their staffs are to operate successfully at the operational level under Marine Corps Doctrine of Maneuver Warfare. The Marine Corps manpower system needs to base its personnel policies on the authoritative guidance of Corps doctrine if we are ever to fight wars and conduct operations short of war successfully. The role doctrine plays in addressing the problems of vertical cohesion is addressed next.

The thoughts contained (within FMFM 1) represent not just guidance for actions in combat, but a way of thinking in general. This manual thus describes a philosophy for action which, in war and in peace, in the field and in the rear, dictates our approach to duty.³⁷

V. COHESIVE DOCTRINE

What makes Marine Corps doctrine different and why is doctrine so important for all to understand especially as it relates to the problems of vertical cohesion?

FMFM 1 is the Marine Corps' cornerstone for all doctrine. It furnishes "the authoritative basis for how we fight and how we prepare to fight."³⁸ It applies to the whole Marine Corps, active and reserve, as well as military and civilian components. It provides the foundation for all remaining Corps doctrine and policy on organization, training, material, and leader development. As this doctrine is applied, both in training and in operations, problems in its interpretation are bound to occur. How we deal with misinterpretations may have a direct impact on our future combat readiness especially in terms of vertical cohesion. Something needs to change when doctrine and supporting policies do not clearly reflect one another.

We can either change doctrine, if it is flawed, or follow doctrine, if it is truly how we think about war, or we can ignore it. There can be no middle ground for policy linked to old philosophies on warfighting. Since Maneuver Warfare doctrine represents a "common view among Marines of the nature of

war," it is time personnel managers change old assignment policies in support of Marine doctrine and the human dimension.

Recent history tells us how personnel managers are attempting to deal with horizontal cohesion and unit morale. What it fails to show is where they are attempting to improve vertical cohesion. They need only to look to our own doctrine for the answers to our vertical cohesion problem.

Marine Corps doctrine is explicit in its human requirements for success in combat. Our own philosophy of command exploits the human ability to communicate implicitly. "We believe that implicit communication -- to communicate through mutual understanding, using a minimum of key, well-understood phrases or even anticipating each other's thoughts -- is a faster, more effective way to communicate than through the use of detailed, explicit, instructions. We develop this ability through familiarity and trust, which are based on a shared philosophy and shared experience."³⁹ The human dimension of familiarity and trust is created only through long-term working relationships. Only after these long-term working relationships are established can the MEF staff even begin to operate in accordance with established doctrine. These working relationships must be established before the crisis begins.

Maneuver warfare doctrine relies on speed and surprise to outmaneuver the enemy. Strength is placed against the enemy's weakness to destroy the enemy physically and psychologically. The Marine Corps' style of warfare requires intelligent leaders with a proclivity for boldness and initiative down to the lowest

levels. FMFM 1 is the Marine Corps philosophy on warfighting. This book expresses an understanding of the characteristics, problems, and demands of war. Key to understanding the broad guidance contained within FMFM 1 is the realization that as guidance it requires judgment in application. People provide judgement and computers provide the rapid retrieval and manipulation of information.⁴⁰ Throughout its short four chapters is the constant reference to the human dimension of combat. FMFM 1 describes war as "one of the most demanding and trying of man's endeavors . . . each episode is the unique product of the dynamic interaction of myriad moral and physical forces."⁴¹

The ideas of speed and concentration are critical to the successful application of Marine Corps Doctrine of maneuver warfare. "Concentration is the convergence of effort in time and space . . . Speed is rapidity of action . . . The combination of concentration and speed is momentum"⁴² When surprise and boldness are added against an enemy's weakness superior combat power is the result. Concentration, speed, surprise, and boldness are ideas used by the commander that enables him to gain the advantage and ultimately results in victory. This theory of war requires leaders prepared for war during times of peace.

FMFM 1 addresses the importance of organizing the Fleet Marine Force, during peacetime, for expeditionary operations in any environment. It recognized the need of being forward deployed or rapidly-deployable. The FMF, according to doctrine, must be able to respond immediately to most types of

conflicts. The above requirement means peacetime tables of organization that reflect the way we intend to fight. Commanders and staffs organized to rapidly-deploy and organized to fight are "expected to be students of the art and science of war at all levels -- tactical, operational, and strategic -- with a solid foundation in military theory and a knowledge of military history and the timeless lessons to be gained from it."⁴³ They must display the human elements of initiative and trust. This calls for long term working relationships needed to develop the necessary familiarity and interdependence considered so vital to the Marine Corps' command and control doctrine found in FMFM 3 Command and Control.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

Many misinterpret "command and control" as "command in control". In Marine Corps doctrine the two functions remain separate. FMFM 3, Command and Control, recognizes that war is a "process that pits the opposing wills of two commanders against each other."⁴⁴ Command and control involves a continuous, dynamic interaction among people, information, and support systems designed to effectively move and process information. Doctrine says that we must operate within the enemy's decision cycle in order to manipulate or deny the enemy access to his command and control systems. The ultimate objective is to achieve a unity of effort and an increase in the tempo of operations to generate decisive combat power required by maneuver warfare. Marine commanders must possess the insight, vision, focus, and direction to:

Clearly define success in the form of "commander's intent."

Establish implicit communications between all levels of command based on mutual understanding and anticipation of each commander's actions.

Foster motivation through leadership and longterm working relationships.

Use an established, common knowledge base of doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures to build competence.

Standardize equipment, facilities, and operating standards for simplicity, interoperability, and flexibility.

Focus command and control by placing decisive information at the right place and time to gain operational and tactical advantage.⁴⁵

All these considerations enhance vertical cohesion.

Marine commanders by doctrine must create a balance between a decentralized command and control system used in maneuver warfare and a centralized system found in firepower and attrition warfare. Decentralized control causes information to flow rapidly up and down the chain of command only to unify effort; most information is passed laterally to ensure coordination and speed of action within the MAGTF. The commander who is confident in the competence and abilities of his subordinates willingly accepts a reduced level of certainty in favor of immediate action. Maneuver warfare further demands that the MAGTF train to operate under decentralized command and control. The

commander's flexibility to centralize or decentralize decisionmaking is critical during rapidly changing situations. Personnel turbulence and its effect on leader-lead cohesion directly influences a commander's ability to operate under decentralized command and control systems. If doctrine is the approved way Marines are to think about war than today's manpower managers must change.

The Prussian General Staff offered several important organizational advances. The officers who did the detailed staff work at all levels, and the orderlies who carried the messages, were now at long last fully militarized experts carefully selected and trained in peace . . . the Prussian staff officers spent much of their careers in a single institution, serving long tours of duty in Berlin and on the staffs of major formations . . . in which every officer knew all the others well.⁴⁶

VI. RECOMMENDATIONS

While doctrine speaks to the importance of a decentralized command and control system for dealing with uncertainty, manpower has failed to provide FMF commander with a cohesive staff that can employ the very principles of maneuver warfare found in FMFM 1. Both the Army and the Marine Corps have not got it entirely right. Neither service has found the solution to the problem of vertical cohesion brought on by the complexity of the expanding battlefield.

The Army is commended for at least recognizing that a problem exists. It is evident, however, from their solutions that they are dealing with the symptoms of the disease and not with the disease itself. FM100-5 Operations is their most recently published doctrine on how they think about war and operations other than war (OOTW). Unlike the Marine Corps they have successfully imbedded their (keystone) doctrine in all supporting doctrine and policy. Programs exist today that teach Army commanders and their staffs to fight as a cohesive team. The BCTP (Battle Command Training Program) is a fine example of the way the Army is simulating the stresses of actual combat command and control functions.

The problem, however, is not in the training but in the need for repetitive training. The frequency of BCTP training is directly linked to Army staff turbulence at the brigade and corps levels. Corps and brigade planners are currently serve 12 to 24 month tours. During these tours they can expect to branch qualify by serving in two or more critical billets before transferring to allow room for others to qualify. Thus the training system itself seems to reinforce the problems of vertical cohesion.

The Marine Corps is in far worse shape. By preaching uncertainty as the norm in battle they are ignoring the problems a turbulent staff will have in time of crisis. Furthermore, they are ignoring the potential for doctrine to minimize staff turbulence and thereby improve vertical cohesion. The usual reaction to such an event is to request augmentation from the duty experts within the Corps to come in and direct the planning process for a commander that feels unsure of his own staff. Unlike the Army, the Corps is unable to staff and support an organization like a BCTP (manned by 200 fieldgrade officer instructors alone). Large training programs like BCTP exist to treat the symptoms and not the disease. Re-training new staffs has become the normal way we attempt to maintain a certain command and control proficiency level within major headquarters. Manpower personnel planners know the only real cures to the problems facing both the Army and Marine Corps are found in policies that increase the personnel stability of the commander and his staff.

If the commander and his staff are to become totally proficient the answer

is obviously found in training but not re-training the same headquarters 12 months later. A staff allowed to gain experience both in their job and in their relationship with the commander is going to be able to practice the decentralized command and control system sought in their warfighting doctrine. That staff will actually find that they can begin to challenge doctrinal practices with the idea of making improvements to existing doctrine. The inputs to change will then come from the practitioners as well as the limited number of scholars within the service's warfighting centers and school houses. Only then can the Corps doctrine of command and control approach theory's definition of an art and science while strengthening vertical cohesion.

An experienced staff who knows how their commander thinks can support his quest for the elusive qualities of a genius. There is no other substitute. Commanders will do the art and staffs will, with the appreciation of statistical and historical data, do the science. How much more could be accomplished in exercising and testing doctrine if the MEF commander had a cohesive staff?

Remember earlier we discussed the Marine Corps' doctrinal principles of concentration and speed. "Concentration is the convergence of effort in time and space . . . Speed is the rapidity of action . . . The combination of concentration and speed is momentum."⁴⁷ A "bold" commander can maintain the momentum only if he possesses a cohesive staff that is capable of making the battlefield come alive for the general. Personnel managers that understand doctrine and the importance of vertical cohesion can make a difference. It is manpower's

responsibility to recruit, group, promote, develop, and move personnel to fill service needs. Today those needs include the doctrinal needs of vertical cohesion. How they do this will foster the qualities that Marine units must have to fight as a cohesive unit.

Manpower needs to support Marine Corps doctrine and not individual career paths. Like those selected for command, staff officers need to be selected for future assignments to staff tours within the three MEFs of the Corps. They need to be school trained at both the intermediate and senior school levels along with future commanders. They should be linked to a specific regional area and reassigned to that area each time their return to the FMF. A regional focus can be enhanced during the schooling process with independent studies, term papers, and area visits. Marine Corps Command and Staff College would develop a semester system and offer staff related courses as electives.

While such a narrow career path reduces one's chances of reaching general officer, in reality most officers by the time they are a senior major already know whether or not that opportunity exists. Today officers are prematurely concerned with service beyond 20 years. This concern is tied to the realities that command selection equates to a proper career progression. This careerist thinking is leading the Corps in the wrong direction. Lieutenants at The Basic School now arrive in the FMF fearful of assignments that do not brief well for augmentation or promotion boards. What is wrong with an early career choice that shifts one's focus to a more realistic goal and thereby improve vertical

cohesion?

The decision to pursue a staff officer career path would in reality become a voluntary action for those with recognized potential. Tour lengths could be modified to allow for extended FMF tours provided overall staffing requirements within the Corps are supported. The decision to pursue a narrower career path and opt for a future as a professional staff officer should first be offered at the fieldgrade level. Officers would carry an additional MOS (Military Occupational Specialty) and be identified as such for future selection boards. Professional staff officers are not a new idea only one that needs to be revisited given today's optempo and the realization that command and control issues have become too critical for manpower to staff with 'continuous life' headquarters.

The solutions to the vertical cohesion problems within the Marine Corps can only be solved with heroic leadership that comes from the top down. Emmett Murphy, author of The Genius of Sitting Bull uses Custer as an example to highlight non-heroic leadership within the business community of the 80s. In Murphy's own mind there are two types of leaders, those who are heroic and those who are non-heroic. "Heroic leaders build on shared commitments. Non-heroic leaders drive toward personal glory."⁴⁸ In the 80s the "me-first" generation symbolized the greed and insensitivity of predatory values. Careerist and "me-first" mentalities are mindsets that work against both horizontal and vertical cohesion and teambuilding resulting in leaders that are more like Custer than Sitting Bull. While I personally wish not to believe that the Corps senior

leadership is anything but heroic, the time has come for that leadership to stop dealing with people like spare parts and institute meaningful change to the personnel assignment system. Empowerment, according to Murphy, is defined as sharing power in order to increase it. It is my own belief that a "heroic" personnel management system that focuses on the human dimension and works towards reducing turbulence will empower the MEF at a time when it is needed most.

VII. CONCLUSIONS

The monograph began with an assessment of the United States Armed Forces and the challenges we face during this transition into the 21st century. We first revisited theory and the importance of the human dimension. We were reminded of the changes brought about by the industrial revolution and their effects on the will of fighting men both individually and as a group. As weapons lethality improved battlefield dispersion increased. Greater dispersion reduced the mutual support among soldiers and created a need for better command and control. Commanders became increasingly more dependent on staffs to provide control of dispersed forces. We reviewed the three levels of war armies go through and how these domains act on soldiers in combat. Group cohesion and its relationship to esprit de corps and unity of purpose are critical factors that tend to hold a unit together in combat.

Recent historical examples helped to illustrate the benefits derived from units that possess a will to fight as a cohesive team. Personnel systems were identified as ones who could either foster or inhibit the qualities that Marines must have to fight well. Current attempts to improve cohesion within the Marine Corps were seen as improvements within horizontal cohesion. While Tour Two and the UDP Program help, neither speaks to vertical cohesion and the requirement for leader-led cohesion.

Having laid the foundation to substantiate the validity of vertical cohesion as a concept the monograph addresses the question "are the Marine Corps

personnel planners providing the necessary human element of command and control to the Fleet Marine Force that its doctrine says it must have to win?" Are current manpower management processes supporting maneuver warfare doctrine by recognizing the importance of unit cohesion both vertical and horizontal?

If doctrine is truly the way we want our Corps to think about warfighting it must be the basis for all subordinate doctrine. Doctrine is an authoritative statement on how we, as a professional organization, intend to operate. As such doctrine itself contributes to vertical and horizontal cohesion. The more acute future battlefield conditions become the more Marine Corps doctrine will be looked to for answers on how we meet the challenges of the 21st Century. Current personnel practices work against our doctrinal values required to build combat effectiveness within the Corps. The answer to the monograph question is that the manpower branch has not recognized the importance of vertical cohesion, particularly at the MEF organization level.

Today as we transition into the 21st Century there needs to be greater attention to the ways we intend to do business. At a time when major restructuring and force reductions are being undertaken, a case must be made for a more creative and determined approach to the utilization of existing forces. Reality is that shrinking defense budgets and reductions in force levels are having devastating consequence on the availability of sufficiently trained and combat ready Marines. In the absence of any greater unit stability horizontal cohesion maybe at the best we can expect in peace time. This realization only accentuates

the importance of improving vertical cohesion within the MEF headquarters.

Future crises demanding immediate response will demand a cohesive plan that comes from a commander and his staff that possess the insight, vision, focus, and direction to balance the requirements of decentralized command and control found in maneuver warfare doctrine.

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